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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article examines whether the conflict classification 
paradigm for international humanitarian law (“IHL”) established by 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions is adequate to regulate armed 
conflicts that center, in whole or in part, on cyber operations.  The 
analysis herein, presented in seven parts, answers that question 
affirmatively, but posits that the advent of cyber operations has 
exposed certain gaps, ambiguities, and fault lines in IHL’s conflict 
classification framework.  After the Introduction, Part II provides 
four examples of situations of violence—three of which amount to 
armed conflicts under IHL and one that does not meet the 
definitional criteria of armed conflict under IHL.  Part III gives an 
overview of conflict classification under IHL.  Parts IV and V 
examine international and non-international armed conflicts, 
respectively.  Part VI highlights four overarching tensions between 
IHL’s conflict classification and cyber operations.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, we live in a highly computerized, networked world1 in 
which the speed, interconnectedness, and sheer volume of computer 
interactions is growing at an exponential rate.2  States, industries, 
and individuals are becoming ever more dependent on information 
technology and its applications and connections.  One need only 
consider the so-called Internet of Things (“IoT”) to put this growth 
trajectory into perspective.  The IoT posits that one day any device 
with an “on-and-off” switch will be capable of being connected to 
the Internet.  It is estimated by 2020 there will be over twenty-six 
billion devices connected to the Internet.3 
When experts at the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”)4 first created the precursor to 
today’s Internet in 1969, it was not possible to predict the broad 
social, political, and economic ramifications that would be directly 
attributable to this new technology.5  What began as a medium for 
                                                             
 1 See GEORG KERSCHISCHNIG, CYBERTHREATS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2012) 
(describing the depth of global technological interconnectedness). 
 2 See BRANDON VALERIANO & RYAN C. MANESS, CYBER WAR VERSUS CYBER 
REALITIES: CYBER CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 20 (2015) (conveying the 
fragility and vulnerability of a system reliant on digital technology). 
 3 See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, FORBES (May 
13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-
explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#2543d2761d09 
[https://perma.cc/XKV8-QZLL] (highlighting the almost endless number of 
devices that could be connected to the Internet). 
 4 See About DARPA, DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-
darpa [https://perma.cc/8XPU-PPXQ] (noting that the mission of DARPA is to 
make critical investments in technologies for national security and the armed 
forces).  DARPA was formed during the Cold War, in part, out of a sense of national 
fear and urgency because of technological advancements being made by the Soviet 
Union.  The Internet is but one of DARPA’s game-changing technological 
innovations.  Others include: precision weapons and stealth technology, automated 
voice recognition and language translation, and Global Positioning System 
receivers small enough to embed in consumer devices. 
 5 See generally DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 
(2015), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/1415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RYA5-RAUK] [hereinafter DOD CYBER STRATEGY] (discussing 
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scientists to quickly and easily share their research grew into an 
interconnected system of computers and databases linking people 
all over the world.6  Experts estimated that, “[b]y the end of 2018 . . . 
51.2 percent of the global population . . . will be using the Internet.”7  
Moreover, Internet access has increased by over two billion people 
worldwide during the last decade alone.8  Food, water, and much of 
society’s critical infrastructure are tied to computer networks, as are 
transportation, health care, and financial services.9  Unsurprisingly, 
this technology of mass empowerment that offers the brightest hope 
and promise to humankind also produces the greatest concern for 
peace, stability, and security.10  Sounding the alarm bell, then-U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, in a speech at the Intrepid Sea, 
Air and Space Museum in New York, issued a dire warning that the 
United States was facing the possibility of a “cyber-Pearl Harbor” 
and was increasingly vulnerable to foreign computer hackers.  He 
specifically commented: 
An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these 
kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches . . . .  
They could derail passenger trains, or even more dangerous, 
derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals.  They 
could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut 
down the power grid across large parts of the country.11 
                                                             
the wide-ranging influence of the Internet on today’s social, political and economic 
landscape). 
 6 See generally id. 
 7 New ITU statistics show more than half the world is now using the Internet, ITU 
News (Dec. 6, 2018), https://news.itu.int/itu-statistics-leaving-no-one-offline/ 
[https://perma.cc/9FV9-RR9X]. 
 8 DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 1. 
 9 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND 
ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 9 
(William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (conveying the 
extent to which essential services to society are dependent on the Internet). 
 10 See BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS 
AND GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES: CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT 20 (2015) 
(acknowledging both the incredible benefits and incredible risks associated with 
reliance on the Internet across sectors). 
 11 Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of 
Cyberattack on U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), 
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Former Secretary Panetta, as well as many others, highlight the 
important truth that technology, more than any other outside force, 
shapes and defines current and future warfare.12  Of course, this is 
not new.  Technology and military operations have always, to one 
degree or another, been inextricably linked.13  From the use of the 
longbow to machine guns to laser-guided munitions and drones, 
technological innovations often determine outcomes in war.14  With 
respect to current and future warfare, it is nearly impossible to 
overstate the importance of information technology.  Today’s armed 
forces use a range of weapons and munitions that are operated by 
information technology.  The command and control of military 
forces is increasingly coordinated and directed through computer-
based networks that allow common pictures and battlefield 
analytics to be seen and shared.  Logistics are entirely dependent on 
information systems.  And, of course, there are highly sophisticated 
cyber weapons that can attack an adversary in both virtual and real 
domains.15 
In recent years, there has been an exponential growth in the 
development of both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities 
across the world.  In many respects, cyber conflict has moved to the 
forefront of many national agendas.16  Experts estimate that 
                                                             
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-
cyberattack.html  [https://perma.cc/3FPS-NDVZ]. 
 12 See Alex Roland, War and Technology, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST., (Feb. 27, 
2009), https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/02/war-and-technology/ 
[https://perma.cc/3RGD-FV5K] (articulating the impact of technology on global 
warfare). 
 13 See generally BINARY BULLETS: THE ETHICS OF CYBERWARFARE 1 (Fritz Allhoff, 
Adam Henschke & Bradley Jay Strawser eds., 2016) (exploring the significant 
integration of technology into military frameworks worldwide). 
 14 See Michael Marshall, Timeline: Weapons technology, NEW SCIENTIST (July 7, 
2009), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17423-timeline-weapons-
technology/ [https://perma.cc/JB7K-JHJW] (discussing the evolution of weapons 
in light of technological advances). 
 15 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 9, at 9 (examining 
the capacity of cyber weapons to exploit vulnerabilities and exact damage in both 
the physical and virtual realm). 
 16 See Gavin Alcott, Cyberwarfare: Policy Challenges for 21st Century Threats, 
PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1607-cyberwarfare-policy-
challenges-for-21st-century [https://perma.cc/G9TC-MM8K] (assessing 
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approximately 140 countries have developed, or are developing, a 
capability to wage cyber war.17  Some countries, like the United 
States, have established major military organizations focused on 
cyberspace and operations.18  In addition to organizational changes, 
there have also been significant doctrinal changes.  For example, in 
2016, NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in 
which the Alliance must defend itself as effectively as it does in the 
air, on land, and at sea.19  Even with the dizzying pace of 
technological change and innovation, it is important to note that the 
current legal paradigm regulating conventional warfare (i.e., jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum) also applies to cyberspace operations.20  The 
relationship between these two branches of international law has 
                                                             
infrastructural vulnerabilities in the U.S. public and private sectors and identifying 
policy gaps in the U.S. approach to cyber warfare). 
 17 See Kevin Coleman, Coleman: The Cyber Arms Race Has Begun, CSO (Jan. 28, 
2008), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2122353/critical-
infrastructure/coleman--the-cyber-arms-race-has-begun.html  
[https://perma.cc/3K8N-4EYC] (evaluating the threats and offensive capabilities 
developing from the cyber arms race). 
 18 See Mission and Vision, U.S. CYBER COMMAND, 
https://www.cybercom.mil/About/Mission-and-Vision/ 
[https://perma.cc/QAF3-8LJY] (noting that the mission of U.S. Cyber Command 
is “to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to 
defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and 
international partners.”). 
 19 See Tomáš Minárik, NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’ 
at Warsaw Summit, CCDCOE (July 21, 2016), https://ccdcoe.org/nato-recognises-
cyberspace-domain-operations-warsaw-summit.html [https://perma.cc/6NX4-
XHZ6] (discussing the idea of treating cyberspace as a “domain of operations”).  See 
also David Alexander, Pentagon to treat cyberspace as “operational domain”, REUTERS 
(July 14, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-cybersecurity-
idUSTRE76D5FA20110714 [https://perma.cc/6NX4-XHZ6] (illustrating the 
United States’ decision to consider cyberspace one of the operational domains in 
addition to land, air, sea). 
 20 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 3 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0] 
(highlighting that jus ad bellum is focused on when a State may use force under 
international law, but that some commentators have observed that the United 
Nations Charter has created a legal regime that would more accurately be 
characterized as jus contra bellum because it is fundamentally devised to prevent the 
use of force).  See also ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 13 (2010) (elaborating on the relationship 
between public international law and the law of armed conflict). 
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been controversial at times.  Although a detailed discussion of that 
relationship is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting 
that jus in bello and jus ad bellum are distinct in purpose and 
application and should not be conflated.21 
This Article addresses issues related to jus in bello, also referred 
to as international humanitarian law (“IHL”).22  Experts have widely 
accepted that IHL23 applies to cyber operations undertaken in the 
context of an armed conflict.24  Stated differently, cyber operations 
in the context of an armed conflict are regulated by well-established 
norms of IHL.  Therefore, the challenge lies not in determining 
whether the law applies, but rather in determining how, specifically, 
the law applies to cyber operations.  Digital means and methods of 
warfare executed in both the virtual and real world pose novel 
issues with respect to IHL.  One of the most complex questions that 
permeates IHL today is how to identify, analyze, and categorize 
armed conflicts under the current binary conflict classification 
paradigm established by the 1949 Geneva Conventions when such 
conflicts include or are limited to cyber operations. 
Under IHL, the classification of an armed conflict is the first step 
in determining the rights and obligations incumbent on the parties 
to that conflict.  IHL recognizes two types of armed conflicts: 
international and non-international.  In an international armed 
                                                             
 21 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (noting in the preamble 
that the application of the Protocol must be fully applied without any adverse 
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes 
espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict). 
 22 International humanitarian law is also referred to as either the law of armed 
conflict or the law of war. 
 23 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 21–23 (2016) (discussing the wide acceptance of IHL’s 
application to cyber operations during armed conflict). 
 24 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 375 (demonstrating that when one 
thinks of the use of cyber in the context of an armed conflict, it not only involves 
the employment of cyber capabilities to objectives in and through cyberspace, but 
also involves weapons reviews to ensure that cyber means of warfare comply with 
the law of armed conflict). 
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conflict, the full corpus of IHL applies.25  By contrast, in a non-
international armed conflict, a more limited portion of IHL applies.26  
Finally, in other situations of violence not amounting to an armed 
conflict, such as sporadic violence, riots, or crime, IHL simply does 
not apply.  However, it is important to note: just because IHL does 
not apply to a situation of violence does not suggest that there is an 
international legal normative void.  International and regional 
human rights law, as well as the peacetime domestic law of the State, 
still applies in those cases.27 
In discussing the importance of conflict classification under IHL, 
Professor Michael Schmitt stated: 
Few international humanitarian law topics are proving as 
problematic in modern warfare as ‘classification of conflict’, 
that is, the identification of the type of conflict to which 
particular hostilities amount as a matter of law.  Classifying 
the conflict in question is always the first step in any 
international humanitarian law analysis, for the nature of the 
conflict determines the applicable legal regime.  
Accordingly, classification is a subject of seminal 
importance.28 
The legal and operational complexities associated with conflict 
classification that include or are limited to cyber operations are 
multi-faceted.  The 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations addresses the question of conflict 
                                                             
 25 See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL 
APPROACH 71 (2012) (illustrating the application of IHL to both international and 
non-international conflicts). 
 26 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME I: RULES XXXIV (2005) (suggesting 
that the amount of substantive IHL protections that apply to a non-international 
armed conflict is not entirely clear; little codified law applies through common 
Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and several other IHL treaties, but as a matter of 
customary law, some influential thought leaders contend that the majority of the 
substantive rules that apply to an international armed conflict also apply to a non-
international armed conflict). 
 27 See MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE QUINTIN, HOW DOES LAW 
PROTECT IN WAR? 124 (2011) (noting that peacetime legal regimes likely provide 
greater protections with respect to the use of force and detention than IHL). 
 28 Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 
245 (2012). 
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classification under IHL in international and non-international 
armed conflicts that include cyber-threat components.  In its nearly 
600 pages, the manual also addresses several other vital issues 
spanning public international law.  For context, in 2009, the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (“NATO CCD 
COE”), a renowned cyber research and training institution in 
Tallinn, Estonia,29 invited a group of independent experts to 
produce a manual on the international law governing cyber 
warfare—a manual now known as the Tallinn Manual 2.0.30  This 
international group of experts, including distinguished scholars and 
practitioners of international law, examined established legal norms 
and the applicability of those norms to cyber warfare.31  In 2013, the 
Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare was 
published and released.  As a result of the success of the first Tallinn 
Manual, the NATO CCD COE initiated a follow-on project to update 
the manual and expand its scope to include the international law 
governing cyber activities during peacetime.  This was also done, in 
part, to respond to the evolving realities of threats and conflict in the 
cyber realm: on a daily basis, States were wrestling with cyber issues 
occurring below the threshold sufficient to constitute a use of force.  
In fact, those events were far more prevalent than issues related to 
the use of force or the conduct of hostilities, which were the domain 
of the first Tallinn Manual.32 
                                                             
 29 See generally About Cyber Defence Centre, CCDCOE, 
https://ccdcoe.org/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/89CJ-2N4M] (discussing 
that the mission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is to 
enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO 
nations and partners in cyber defense through education, research and 
development, lessons learned and consultation). 
 30 See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20. 
 31 See generally id. 
 32 Impressively, Tallinn Manual 2.0 contains 154 rules, including two specific 
rules on international and non-international armed conflict, Rules 82 and 83.  The 
detailed commentary accompanying each rule not only offers important insights 
into the deliberations and thought processes of the experts regarding the legal basis 
and justification for the rules and their normative context, but also offers practical 
implications of the rules’ application in a cyber context.  This level of detail is 
particularly helpful for national legal advisors and academics.  Additionally, the 
commentaries to the rules express the positions articulated by the experts in their 
internal discussions so that it is evident to the reader whether the Experts were able 
to reach a consensus on a particular issue.  Finally, and most importantly, it is 
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2.  CYBER OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES 
Armed conflicts that include or are limited to cyber operations 
can be challenging to classify within the IHL legal framework.  In 
fact, some of the most well-known, highly publicized cyber 
incidents fail to meet the threshold for either international or non-
international armed conflict under IHL.  That is not to say that such 
incidents occur in an international normative gap; they do not.  
Rather, such incidents are regulated by legal regimes, whether 
domestic or international, which otherwise operate during 
peacetime.  Such legal regimes possess their own distinct 
frameworks of rights, duties, processes, and potential sanctions.  
The case studies outlined below highlight how four unique 
situations of violence involving cyber operations are either 
international or non-international armed conflicts subject to IHL 
regulation or how they are neither. 
The first case study involving Estonia is a situation not 
amounting to an armed conflict.  On April 27, 2007, Estonia was hit 
by a large-scale, persistent series of distributed denial of service 
(“DDoS”)33 attacks.  These attacks overwhelmed and shut down the 
websites of Estonian government ministries, political parties, 
newspapers, banks, and companies.34  The attacks were particularly 
harmful in Estonia—given its reliance on the Internet for everything 
from grocery shopping and parking, to banking and voting.  The 
DDoS cyber-attacks were part of a larger protest movement35 
following a highly-controversial decision by the Estonian 
government to relocate a Soviet war memorial from its original 
                                                             
important to understand and appreciate that the experts were limiting themselves 
to an objective restatement of the lex lata.  They avoided including statements 
reflecting the lex ferenda.  See id. at 3 (highlighting the approach of the authors 
regarding the concept of lex lata). 
 33 See id. at 564–65 (noting that DDoS is a method that employs many different 
computing devices to cause a denial of service to single or multiple targets). 
 34 See HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 38–
39 (2014) (highlighting the attacks’ effects on Estonian websites). 
 35 See Steven Lee Myers, Estonia removes Soviet-era war memorial after a night of 
violence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/europe/27iht-
estonia.4.5477141.html [https://perma.cc/CR6F-N33V] (discussing the removal of 
a Soviet-era war memorial and resulting protests and violence). 
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location in the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery on the 
outskirts of the city.  The Soviets originally built the monument in 
1947 to commemorate their war dead after defeating the Nazis in the 
Baltic region.36  The culprits of the cyber-attacks were believed to be 
a small group of Russian activists associated with the pro-Kremlin 
youth group, Nashi.37  These attacks appeared to come from Russian 
IP addresses with online instructions written in Russian.  
Furthermore, Russia ignored the Estonian government’s appeals for 
assistance.38 
The second case study involves the armed conflict between 
Russia and Georgia in the summer of 2008—an effort to exert control 
over an ethnic enclave bordering the two countries known as South 
Ossetia.  In 1990, South Ossetia had declared its independence from 
Georgia and, following “a two-year war and an imperfect 
ceasefire . . .  operated for nearly two decades as [an] independent 
state.”39  In 2008, Georgia launched a military offensive to retake 
control of South Ossetia.40  Russia, which had long supported South 
Ossetia’s secessionist efforts, sent its armed forces into South Ossetia 
and also targeted important military and transport hubs situated 
elsewhere within Georgia.41  Georgia’s defenses were wholly 
                                                             
 36 See Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED 
(Aug. 21, 2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/ 
[https://perma.cc/W9N9-7XEW] (providing background information on a war 
memorial and the consequences facing the Estonian government for removing it). 
 37 See Christian Lowe, Kremlin loyalist says launched Estonia cyber-attack, 
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-estonia-
cyberspace/kremlin-loyalist-says-launched-estonia-cyber-attack-
idUSTRE52B4D820090313 [https://perma.cc/9HU7-TEXS] (examining a pro-
Kremlin youth activist’s claim that the organization was behind the electronic 
attack on Estonia). 
 38 See Damien McGuinness, How a cyber attack transformed Estonia, BBC (Apr. 
27, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/39655415 [https://perma.cc/PX85-SNP6] 
(noting the Russian government’s limited involvement in the Estonian conflict). 
 39 Stephanie Joyce, Along A Shifting Border, Georgia And Russia Maintain An 
Uneasy Peace, NPR (Mar. 13, 2017), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/03/13/519471110/along-a-
shifting-border-georgia-and-russia-maintain-an-uneasy-peace 
[https://perma.cc/GF4J-5Z3W]. 
 40 See id. (explaining that, in August 2008, “Georgia launched an offensive of 
the breakaway region.”). 
 41 See Charles King, The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia 
Crisis, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov.-Dec., 2008), 
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inadequate to rebuff Russia’s aggressions, and the ensuing five-day 
armed conflict killed hundreds of people and sent thousands of 
refugees to temporary shelters.42  In addition to the kinetic fight, 
Russia launched cyber operations against Georgia both before and 
during the international armed conflict.  In so doing, Russia 
demonstrated the effectiveness of cyber operations in support of a 
conventional conflict.43  In particular, a number of Georgian 
government websites were defaced and had their content replaced 
with anti-Georgian messages.44  In fact, the multiple D.D.O.S. attacks 
resulted in the website of the Georgian president being inoperable 
for 24 hours.45  The cyber-attack, overall, severely limited Georgia’s 
ability to disseminate information.46  At the operational and tactical 
levels, it is believed that Russian cyber operations were closely 
coordinated with conventional forces to enhance operational 
effectiveness.  For example, “networks and web sites within specific 
geographic locations were targeted for denial and disruption 
operations in order to cause panic and uncertainty (disruption) in 
the Georgian civilian population.”47  As noted by David Hollis, 
Russia’s use of cyber operations against Georgia “appears to be the 
first case in history of a coordinated cyberspace domain attack 
synchronized with major combat actions in the other warfighting 
domains (consisting of Land, Air, Sea, and Space).”48 
                                                             
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war 
[https://perma.cc/KY8B-K9AK] (discussing the response of Georgian forces to 
attacks by secessionists in South Ossetia). 
 42 See id. (describing the consequences of the attacks by secessionists in South 
Ossetia). 
 43 See DINNISS, supra note 34, at 8 ( explaining Russia’s approach to its 
conflict with Georgia). 
 44 MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 8 (2016) (describing the positive effects of cyber operations in Russia). 
 45 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html (noting the 
effects of the cyberspace attack on Georgia). 
 46 Id. 
 47 David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS JOURNAL (Jan. 
6, 2011), https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VG99-JTES]. 
 48 Id.  See also generally PAUL ROSENZWEIG, CYBER WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN 
CYBERSPACE ARE CHALLENGING AMERICA AND CHANGING THE WORLD 33 (2013) 
(detailing the Russian–Georgian war). 
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The third case study is Operation Olympic Games, a highly 
sophisticated and targeted cyber-attack, reportedly launched (but 
never officially acknowledged) by the United States and Israel 
against an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran.  Fred 
Kaplan’s book, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, details 
the events leading up to the operation beginning in 2006.  According 
to Kaplan, President Bush wanted to derail or slow down the Iranian 
nuclear program.  President Bush did not, however, want to launch 
airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility.  Instead, he 
sought an option between doing nothing and a kinetic attack.  
President Bush settled on a cyber-attack on the computer control 
systems at the Natanz facility.49  After creating and covertly 
inserting a cyber “beacon” into the Iranian computer network to 
map out the workings of the plant, attackers inserted a highly 
complex worm, sometimes called “Stuxnet,”50 into the plant’s 
computer controller system.51  The Stuxnet worm took over some of 
the uranium enrichment centrifuges operated by the control system, 
making them spin either too fast or too slow.52  This process made 
them unbalanced and, in some cases, caused centrifuges to explode.  
Over time, new variants of the Stuxnet worm were created and 
surreptitiously inserted into the control systems resulting in slightly 
different failures.53  Stuxnet was designed to leave no trace of the 
                                                             
 49 See generally FRED KAPLAN, DARK TERRITORY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CYBER 
WAR 203–4 (2016) (describing the American government’s response to Operation 
Olympic Games). 
 50 See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital 
Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-
zero-day-stuxnet/ [https://perma.cc/95UT-84HS](discussing the discovery of the 
Stuxnet by a Belarus security firm hired to troubleshoot a series of computers in 
Iran that were malfunctioning). 
 51 Guilbert Gates, How a Secret Cyberwar Program Worked, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 
2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/how-a-
secret-cyberwar-program-worked.html [https://perma.cc/TP4Y-DZU6] 
(describing the way secret cyberwar programs work). 
 52 See Uranium Enrichment, U.S. NRC (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html 
[https://perma.cc/3CFB-XXM4] (describing the process of uranium enrichment). 
 53 See Gates, supra note 51 (discussing the changes made to Stuxnet and the 
resulting consequences of those changes). 
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attackers.54  General Michael Hayden, the former director of the 
NSA and CIA, commented on this milestone in modern warfare: 
Previous cyber-attacks had effects limited to other 
computers . . .  This is the first attack of a major nature in 
which a cyber-attack was used to effect physical destruction.  
And no matter what you think of the effects--and I think 
destroying a cascade of Iranian centrifuges is an unalloyed 
good--you can’t help but describe it as an attack on critical 
infrastructure . . . .Somebody has crossed the Rubicon.  
We’ve got a legion on the other side of the river now.  
Something had shifted in the nature and calculation of 
warfare, just as it had after the United States dropped atom 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaskai at the end of World War 
II.55 
The last case study involves the United States’ fight against the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”).  In addition to conventional 
and special operations combat against ISIS fighters in Iraq, Syria, 
and elsewhere, the United States launched a new cyber campaign 
against ISIS forces in 2016.56  Such a response to ISIS is appropriate 
and necessary, in part, because no other non-State armed group in 
history has capitalized more on information technology.  ISIS has 
demonstrated that it is extremely adept at using this technology for 
such functions as command and control of its forces, recruitment, 
and propaganda, among other things.57  One particular operation 
against ISIS, code-named Operation Glowing Symphony, was carried 
                                                             
 54 Paul Szoldra, A new film gives a frightening look at how the US used cyberwarfare 
to destroy nukes, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/zero-
days-stuxnet-cyber-weapon-2016–7 [https://perma.cc/XP3V-HAFG] (discussing 
the effects of Stuxnet).  But see David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of 
Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html [https://perma.cc/6U4T-DFUQ] 
(describing a programming error that caused an element of the program to become 
public). 
 55 KAPLAN, supra note 49, at 215. 
 56 David E. Sanger, U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-
directs-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/U5ED-6JK8] 
(discussing how the United States directed cyber weapons at ISIS). 
 57 See id. (discussing ISIS’s proficient use of technology). 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/3
2019] Conflict Classification and Cyber Operations 657 
out by U.S. Cyber Command’s Joint Task Force Ares.58  As part of 
the operation, Task Force Ares removed ISIS propaganda and 
locked ISIS administrators out of their accounts.  A debate arose, 
however, surrounding whether the U.S. must disclose its plan to 
conduct cyber operations to countries whose servers may house ISIS 
data, outside of the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.59  One significant 
impact that has been attributed, at least in part, to cyber operations 
against ISIS is the reduction in the number of foreign fighters going 
to Mideast conflict zones to join ISIS—new recruits have dropped 
from 2,000 per month to 500, and overall personnel strength has 
dropped from 35,000 to 20,000.60 
These four case studies on cyber operations illustrate the 
spectrum of conflict in the cyber realm.  Depending upon where the 
situation falls along the spectrum, IHL either does not apply at all, 
applies minimally, or applies fully.  Without question, some cases 
are more difficult to assess than others, as will be seen in the analysis 
below.  Implicit in any analysis of conflict classification is the fact 
that there must be some nexus between the cyber operation or 
activity and the conflict for IHL to apply.  In other words, if a cyber 
activity occurs but is unrelated to the armed conflict, IHL does not 
regulate it.  Not surprisingly, there can be significant debate as to 
the nature and scope of that nexus.61  Beyond that threshold 
connection, looking at conflict classification under IHL through a 
cyber lens raises many challenging issues. 
                                                             
 58 Ellen Nakashima, U.S. military cyber operation to attack ISIS last year sparked 
heated debate over alerting allies, WASH. POST (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-cyber-
operation-to-attack-isis-last-year-sparked-heated-debate-over-alerting-
allies/2017/05/08/93a120a2-30d5-11e7-9dec-
764dc781686f_story.html?utm_term=.6cc9d75e8b91 [https://perma.cc/9SGU-
86C3] (explaining how the U.S. government conducted Operation Glowing 
Symphony). 
 59 See id. 
 60 Rowan Scarborough, Obama launches first cyberwar against isis, cuts recruiting 
by 75 percent, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/12/obama-administration-
takes-isis-fight-into-cybersp/ [https://perma.cc/JR9W-K9X2] (asserting a 
relationship between the Obama administration’s first cyberwar and a reduction in 
the number of foreign fighters joining the terrorist army in Syria). 
 61 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 376 (discussing the relationship 
between IHL and cyber conflicts). 
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3.  CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW—AN OVERVIEW 
For the period following the Peace of Westphalia up until the 
end of World War II, the jus in bello applied almost exclusively to 
wars between States.62  Unpacking this historical context, Professor 
Akande observed: 
This was a consequence of the fact that international law as 
a whole was concerned only with relations between States 
and eschewed regulations of matters considered to be within 
the domestic jurisdiction of States.  Internal armed conflicts, 
or civil wars, were not considered to be ‘real war[s] in the 
strict sense of the term in International Law,’ since that term 
was reserved for conflicts between States.63 
IHL applied to internal armed conflicts only under very limited 
circumstances, in which either the State involved or a third State 
recognized the belligerency of the insurgent group.64  Recognition of 
belligerency was permitted—thereby triggering IHL—if the 
insurgent group: (1) occupied territory; (2) established a 
government which exercised sovereign rights over the territory it 
occupied; and (3) complied with the laws and customs of war during 
hostilities with the State.65  In the aftermath of World War II, there 
were seismic changes to IHL generally and conflict classification 
specifically. 
On August 12, 1949, a diplomatic conference in Geneva, 
Switzerland approved the text of four conventions—the 1949 
Geneva Conventions—which more States have ratified than any 
                                                             
 62 See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in 
32 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 33 (Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (discussing the classification of conflict type during the 
specified time period). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. (discussing the growing application of IHL to intra-State warfare in 
the years leading up to World War II, particularly during the and Spanish Civil 
War). 
 65 Dietrich Schindler, Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE SCOPE AND 
APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 48 (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg eds., 2012) (citation omitted). 
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other international agreements in the laws regulating warfare.66  The 
Conventions were, in part, borne out of the unprecedented violence 
and suffering of World War II.67  As Ambassador George H. Aldrich 
commented: 
[T]he history of development of this branch of international 
law is largely one of reaction to bad experience.  After each 
major war, the survivors negotiate rules for the next war that 
they would, in retrospect, like to have seen in force during 
the last war.  The 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions attest 
to that pattern.68 
                                                             
 66 See ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 195 
(2000) (describing the four 1949 Geneva Conventions).  To provide some 
background and context, the Geneva Conventions can be traced back to a well-to-
do Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant, and the Battle of Solferino in 1859.  The 
Battle of Solferino in Lombardy, not far from Milan and Verona, was fought 
between the forces of Austria and a French-Piedmontese alliance.  The battle was 
one of the bloodiest of the 19th century with thousands of dead and wounded on 
both sides.  The military practice of the time was to leave the wounded where they 
had fallen on the battlefield.  Dunant witnessed the carnage.  After the battle, he 
provided aid and comfort to survivors.  Dunant could not forget what he saw and 
experienced.  In 1862, he published a small book entitled A Memory of Solferino.  In 
the book, Dunant vividly and graphically described the battle and the suffering of 
the wounded soldiers.  He also called for the creation of relief societies in each 
country that would act as auxiliaries to the army medical services and facilitate care 
for all wounded and sick, regardless of State affiliation.  This effort led eventually 
to the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.  Also, as part of 
Dunant’s vision in A Memory of Solferino, he proposed that an international principle 
be created to serve as the basis for these societies.  Dunant’s idea ultimately led to 
the Swiss government hosting an official diplomatic conference in August 1864, 
which resulted in the adoption of the first Geneva Convention.  In 1901, Dunant 
was awarded the first-ever Nobel Peace Prize for what was accurately described as 
the “supreme humanitarian achievement of the 19th century.”  See Solferino and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (June 1, 2010), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2010/solferino-
feature-240609.htm [https://perma.cc/5T44-4DWN] (discussing Dunant’s 
contributions to Red Cross and Geneva Conventions). 
 67 See Philip Spoerri, Director of Int’l Law, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Address at 
the Ceremony to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions (Dec. 
8, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-
conventions-statement-120809.htm [https://perma.cc/L36W-5SZP] (discussing 
the origins of the Geneva Conventions). 
 68 SOLIS, supra note 23, at 88. 
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Generally speaking, the 1949 Conventions expanded the scope 
of IHL to include the addition of a fourth convention that focused 
on the protection of civilians during armed conflicts.69  Additionally, 
the other three Conventions were updated and revised.70  Among 
the revisions was the creation of two articles that are included, in 
identical form, in all four of the Geneva Conventions – Common 
Articles 2 and 3.  More influential than other treaties, the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions are the cornerstone of modern IHL.71 
Of the many important contributions made by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions to the corpus of IHL, perhaps none is of greater 
consequence than the binary conflict classification paradigm 
prescribed by common Articles 2 and 3.72  This new legal 
classification framework marked a sea change in the 
conceptualization of wars.  As mentioned previously, the jus in bello 
was developed in the context of wars between States, applying only 
to conflicts of an international nature with little application to civil 
wars.73  Moreover, the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, and 1929 
did not have a specific provision defining the scope of their 
application.74  It was not until the 1949 Geneva Conventions that a 
                                                             
 69 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, ar. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 70 See CORN ET AL., supra note 25, at 70 (describing the four Geneva 
Conventions). 
 71 See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 88 (describing the Geneva Conventions).  
Historically, the jus in bello was perceived to have two traditions or families: “Hague 
Law” and “Geneva Law.”  The primary focus of Hague Law was to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities.  By contrast, Geneva Law focused on the protections of the 
victims of armed conflict.  Today, those distinctions do not exist.  IHL is an 
amalgamation of both Hague and Geneva Law.  Id. 
 72 See Id. at 91 (describing the Conventions’ articles).  As the name implies, 
common articles are contained in all four Geneva Conventions.  That is, the 
substance of the articles is so important that the drafters of the Conventions 
included the same or similar articles in each of the four Conventions.  In a sense, 
the common articles, along with certain general principles, link the four 
Conventions.  The common articles, of which there are about twenty, are found 
among the general provisions at the beginning of each Convention, among the 
articles relating to treaty execution, and among the concluding procedural 
provisions.  See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 66, at 195 (discussing the common 
articles among the Geneva Conventions). 
 73 See Akande, supra note 62, at 33 (discussing conflict classification). 
 74 See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY OF 2016, art. 2, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&doc
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distinction between international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts was codified. 
The scope and applicability of IHL depends on the existence of 
an armed conflict.75  This is true for both international and non-
international armed conflicts because IHL did not adopt a unitary 
concept of an armed conflict.76  Interestingly, even though the notion 
of an armed conflict is perhaps the single most important concept in 
IHL, it has never been defined by a treaty.77  Some publicists have 
even commented that the drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
avoided a rigid definition of an armed conflict because such a 
formulation might limit the applicability of the treaties.78  To fully 
understand and appreciate the binary conflict classification 
paradigm, it is necessary to look at common Articles 2 and 3 
separately. 
4.  COMMON ARTICLE 2:  INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in 
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even 
if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to 
the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto 
                                                             
umentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518#_Toc452041590 [hereinafter 
2016 COMMENTARY, GC I]. 
 75 See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 74 (discussing the application of the laws 
of armed conflicts). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 45 (2012) (discussing 
various attempts to define armed conflicts). 
 78 See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 159 (discussing the implications of defining an 
armed conflict for IHL purposes). 
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shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.  They shall 
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the 
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions 
thereof.79 
At its core, this foundational provision establishes the 
circumstances and conditions under which the four Conventions 
apply.80  Specifically, the Conventions, in their entirety, are triggered 
by a declared war,81 an international armed conflict, or a partial or 
total occupation.82  A fourth situation covering wars of national 
liberation was added with Article 1(4) of Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (“Protocol 
I”).83  This provision “widened the scope of applicability of the law 
                                                             
 79 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]. 
 80 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at para. 192 (“This provision is a 
central pillar of the Geneva Conventions as it establishes the circumstances and 
conditions under which the Conventions apply.”). 
 81 See id. at paras. 203–209 (defining declared war). 
 82 See Geneva I, supra note 79, at art. 2.  The portion of IHL that addresses a 
total or partial occupation is embodied in selected provisions of the Annexed 
Regulations to Hague Convention IV of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, and customary international law.  Accordingly, the entirety of IHL is triggered 
when a successful invader establishes effective control over enemy territory.  That 
is, a territory is considered occupied once it is placed under the authority of a hostile 
army. 
 83 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) art.1(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].  Article 
1(4), sometimes referred to as the “CARs” provision (colonial domination, alien 
occupation, and racist regimes), was one of the objectionable points for the United 
States in terms of ratifying AP I.  The provision provided as follows: 
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
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governing international armed conflicts by recognizing so-called 
‘internationalized’ wars, although the kinds of armed conflict that 
fall into that ‘new’ category remain unsettled.”84  Thus, if the factual 
situation meets the criteria for one of the four situations outlined 
above, it can be said to be an international or inter-State armed 
conflict.85  It is important to note that it does not matter whether a 
party or parties to the armed conflict deny the existence of an armed 
conflict for political or other reasons.  Conflict classification depends 
only on the circumstances prevailing on the ground at the time.86  Of 
course, the key inquiry from an IHL perspective is when an armed 
conflict exists between two or more States such that the body of law 
is triggered.87 
To adequately address this question, it is necessary to provide 
some background and context about several important IHL concepts 
related to or embedded in common Article 2.  First, the general 
criteria in common Article 2 have crystallized into rules that govern 
the applicability of all IHL rules under international armed conflicts, 
for both customary and conventional law, and are not limited only 
to the applicability of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.88  
Accordingly, all IHL treaties, including older ones, as well as 
                                                             
The essence of the objection is that it blurs the distinction between international and 
non-international armed conflicts based upon the asserted motive of the non-State 
group fighting against the government of a State.  See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 133 
(explaining the U.S. objection to ratifying the Convention). 
 84 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Introduction, in THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 65, at xi. 
 85 KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 74. 
 86 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at para. 211 (“Article 2(1) underlines 
the pre-eminence of the factual existence of armed conflict over the formal status of 
war.”). 
 87 See Akande, supra note 62, at 39 (discussing how to define an armed 
conflict).  Although beyond the scope of this Article, there is also the question of 
when an international armed conflict ends.  Assessing the end of an armed conflict 
can be a very difficult matter.  An international armed conflict ends when there has 
been a general close of military operations.  See CORN ET AL., supra note 25, at 70 
(“The drafters [of Common Articles 2 and 3] responded to the inherent insufficiency 
of the international definition of war as the trigger for law application, by including 
law triggering articles in the revised Conventions and the humanitarian protections 
they provide.”). 
 88 KOLB & HYDE, supra note 20, at 75. 
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customary international law applies to a declared war, an 
international armed conflict, or a partial or total occupation.89 
Second, as highlighted previously, common Article 2(1) 
introduced, but did not define, the term “armed conflict” into the 
IHL lexicon, making the application of the law less dependent upon 
the formalisms associated with a declared war.90  The term “armed 
conflict” connotes an objective standard to be assessed on the basis 
of the prevailing facts.91  As such, from 1949 onwards, the notion of 
armed conflict supplanted the traditional concept of war under 
IHL.92  Because the term “armed conflict” was not defined in the 
1949 Geneva Conventions or in any other IHL treaty, Common 
Article 2 in no way qualifies “the armed conflict” with scope, 
duration, or intensity requirements.93  This leaves the interpretation 
and amplification of the term “armed conflict” in the hands of 
tribunals and commentators to provide such clarity. 
Third, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) proposed a definition of 
international armed conflict in its landmark Tadić (Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) case.  The Tribunal stated, in part, as follows: 
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.  International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed 
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until 
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of 
internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.  Until 
that moment, international humanitarian law continues to 
                                                             
 89 Id. 
 90 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at para. 193 (“Article 2(1) 
broadens the Geneva Conventions’ scope of application by introducing the notion 
of ‘armed conflict’, thereby making their application less dependent on the 
formalism attached to the notion of ‘declared war’.”). 
 91 Id. at para. 211 (“[T]he determination of the existence of an armed conflict 
within the meaning of Article 2(1) must be based solely on the prevailing facts 
demonstrating the de facto existence of hostilities between the belligerents, even 
without a declaration of war.”). 
 92 SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 122. 
 93 CORN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74. 
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apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the 
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the 
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place 
there.94 
Having established that legal scaffolding, the next task is to 
determine what “international” and “armed” mean in terms of 
common Article 2.  In this regard, “‘[i]nternational’ . . . is effectively 
synonymous with inter-state.”95  The most obvious situation 
involves two or more States as parties to the conflict on opposing 
sides.96  Furthermore, a conflict is internationalized when a non-
State armed group—acting under the control of a State party—
engages in hostilities against an opposing State party.97  Again, from 
the Tadić case, the ICTY considered the issue of whether Bosnian 
Serb units were sufficiently directed by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to conclude that an international armed conflict existed 
for the purposes of conflict classification under IHL.98  In articulating 
the overall control standard, the Appeals Chamber stated, in part, as 
follows: 
[C]ontrol by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias 
or paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and 
must comprise more than the mere provision of financial 
assistance or military equipment or training).  This 
requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the 
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each 
individual operation.  Under international law it is by no 
means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan 
all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose 
their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the 
conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of 
international humanitarian law.  The control required by 
international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, 
                                                             
 94 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 95 CORN ET AL. supra note 25, at 82. 
 96 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 380. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) 
has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the 
military actions of the military group, in addition to 
financing, training and equipping or providing operational 
support to that group.99 
Under this standard, the legal threshold is relatively high for 
internationalizing a conflict that involves subordinate or “proxy” 
forces.  Accordingly, merely providing support to non-State actors 
does not internationalize it pursuant to common Article 2.100  
Moreover, a non-State armed group, as a collective entity, means 
something more than just an individual or an insufficiently 
organized group.101  Put in a slightly different way, the overall 
control test is a manifestation of the application of well-established 
legal principles of the law of State responsibility in determining 
whether and when non-State armed groups amount to de facto 
agents of a third State.102  In contrast to the “international” 
requirement under common Article 2, the “armed” requirement can 
be even more complex in theory and application. 
In Tadić, the ICTY set and reinforced a relatively low legal 
benchmark for the “armed” element of an international armed 
conflict.  The standard the court created is: “whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between States.”103  As such, there is neither a 
duration requirement nor an intensity requirement in terms of the 
number of victims or the destruction of property.  Even with this 
low standard, which is intended to provide the broadest possible 
IHL coverage, there are some situations that would not trigger an 
international armed conflict in terms of State practice.  For example, 
the replacing of border patrol agents with members of the armed 
forces; an accidental incursion into the sovereign territory of another 
State; or the accidental bombing within the territory of another 
                                                             
 99 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 137 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 100 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 381. 
 101 Id. 
 102 SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 122 (explaining the standard 
rule that “a conflict between governmental forces and rebel forces within a single 
country becomes of international character if the rebel forces are de facto agents of a 
third State”). 
 103 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 94, at ¶ 70. 
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country would not, in and of themselves, trigger an international 
armed conflict under IHL.104  The 1960 commentary to the Third 
Geneva Convention succinctly synopsized the intent of States with 
respect to the low “armed” requirement under common Article 2: 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed 
conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the 
Parties denies the existence of a state of war.  It makes no 
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter 
takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces; it 
suffices for the armed forces of one Power to have captured 
adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4.  Even if there 
has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the 
Convention are detained is sufficient for its application.  The 
number of persons captured in such circumstances is, of 
course, immaterial.105 
Applying the above to digital operations, Tallinn Manual 2.0 -- 
Rule 82 speaks to cyber operations in the context of an international 
armed conflict.  It states: “[a]n international armed conflict exists 
whenever there are hostilities, which may include or be limited to 
cyber operations, between two or more States.”106  Two of the above 
case studies may fairly be characterized as international armed 
conflicts under Rule 82 and two may not. 
The first is the most straightforward and arguably the least 
controversial, i.e., the international armed conflict between Russia 
and Georgia in 2008.  But, as the analysis below will demonstrate, 
even the most straightforward incident raises significant legal issues 
when the conflict includes or is limited to cyber operations.  In the 
Russian-Georgian international armed conflict over South Ossetia, 
there were cyber operations that occurred before and during the 
                                                             
 104 BOOTHBY, supra note 77, at 45. 
 105 COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR 67 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument 
&documentId=07B4DAD7719E37E4C12563CD00424D17 [https://perma.cc/7J3P-
K5UN] [hereinafter Commentary, GC III]. 
 106 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 379. 
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conventional fighting.107  The cyber operations launched by Russia 
against Georgia raise a number of challenging questions.  The first 
question is: when precisely did the international armed conflict 
commence?  The answer to this question is important because the 
start date is what triggers the application of IHL.108  As early as July 
20, 2008, there were DDoS attacks that shut down Georgian 
servers.109  On or about August 8, 2008, Russia conducted airstrikes 
against Georgian targets and Russian troops physically moved into 
South Ossetia to provide support to the separatists in their fight 
against Georgia.110 
So, did the armed conflict start on August 8th with the 
conventional attack, or did it begin approximately three weeks 
earlier with the DDoS attacks?  Complicating that answer are two 
other related, subsidiary questions.  The first is the ever-thorny 
question of attribution.  Who precisely authorized and conducted 
the cyber operations against Georgia: military electronic warriors, 
patriotic hackers, cyber criminals, or some other groups?  In 
cyberspace, it is easy to cloak identities, operate through third-
parties, and route operations through servers from around the 
world, making it very difficult to attribute the cyber operations to a 
particular State, group, or individual.111  Also, with respect to the 
DDoS attacks beginning on July 20th, was there a sufficient nexus 
between those cyber-attacks and the conventional armed conflict 
that began three weeks later?  Given the above, even the most 
uncomplicated scenario is riddled with uncertainty about when the 
international armed conflict started and who precisely was a party 
to it.  Over and above the other questions, assuming arguendo, that 
the organization that launched the cyber operations against Georgia 
was either an organ of the Russian State or a de facto agent of Russia, 
                                                             
 107 Hollis, supra note 47, at 2–3. 
 108 See generally Markoff, supra note 45 (elaborating on the extent of cyber 
operations conducted against Georgia and when those activities began). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard & C. J. Chivers, Russia and Georgia Clash 
Over Separatist Region, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html 
[https://perma.cc/PC4P-NBFQ]. 
 111 See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, Top Georgian Official: Moscow Cyber Attacked Us 
– We Just Can’t Prove It, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2009), 
https://www.wired.com/2009/03/georgia-blames/ [https://perma.cc/H248-
TTBC] (noting the difficulties of pinpointing the sources of cyber operations in the 
investigation of an attack against Georgian cyber infrastructure). 
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were the DDoS attacks a “resort to armed force” sufficient to trigger 
an international armed conflict?  Alternatively, should the DDoS be 
viewed merely as another form of a conventional attack—like any 
other type of military preparation of the battlefield?  Should the 
focus be on the usefulness or effectiveness of the preparation, rather 
than the format (cyber)?  These questions do not lend themselves to 
easy answers.  In sum, the above gaps, ambiguities, and fault lines 
highlight that even the most uncomplicated scenario is strewn with 
uncertainty and complexity because it included cyber means and 
methods and occurred, at least in part, in cyberspace. 
Although not one of the case studies, an interesting corollary to 
the Russian-Georgian international armed conflict from a cyber 
operations perspective was Russia’s use of cyber operations against 
Ukraine.112  Since July 2014, there has been an international armed 
conflict between Ukraine and Russia.  Parenthetically, this 
international armed conflict is parallel to an ongoing non-
international armed conflict in Ukraine.113  And, of course, Russia 
occupied and then annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 
2014.114  From a cyber operations perspective, the most well-known 
incident occurred in 2015 when the electricity was cut for nearly a 
quarter-million Ukrainians by highly sophisticated hackers who 
successfully attacked a power grid.  Additionally, about a year later, 
a transmission station was taken down through a cyberattack.115  
                                                             
 112 See generally Ukraine Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/ukraine-fast-
facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/P34E-WAZY] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) 
(providing basic factual information about Ukraine and a timeline of important 
developments in Ukraine’s national history relating to Russia). 
 113 International Armed Conflict in Ukraine, RULE L. ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT 
(RULAC) GENEVA ACAD. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. & HUM. RTS., (Sept. 11, 2017), 
http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-in-
ukraine#collapse2accord [https://perma.cc/JM4G-PS3D] (last visited Oct. 16, 
2017) (recognizing that the available information does suggest the existence of an 
armed conflict in eastern Ukraine from July 2014). 
 114 See Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-
crimea [https://perma.cc/7RKX-UC5H] (delineating interpretations of Putin’s 
motives for annexing Crimea). 
 115 See Was Russian Hacking of Ukraine’s Power Grid a Test Run for U.S. Attack?, 
CBS NEWS (June 23, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-hacking-of-
ukraines-power-grid-test-run-for-us-attack/ [https://perma.cc/RS8X-WU89] 
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Since then, there has been a growing roster of Ukrainian companies 
and government agencies that have been plagued by cyberattacks, 
often being hit in rapid succession.116  Additionally, cyber security 
experts detected a malware implant on Android devices which was 
used to track the movements of Ukrainian artillery units and then 
target them.  The significance of such a cyberattack is obvious.  
Hackers were able to access the communications of its adversaries 
and the geolocations of the devices themselves, which enabled 
Russia to effectively target Ukrainian artillery.117  Unsurprisingly, 
the Ukrainians accused the Russians of these cyber operations.  
Oleksandr Tkachuk, the Chief of Staff for Ukraine’s Security Service, 
alleged that the cyberattacks were coordinated by the Russian 
security service with assistance from private software firms and 
criminal hackers.  Moscow has repeatedly and persistently denied 
accusations that it has engaged in cyber operations against 
Ukraine.118 
The Stuxnet case study also raises the question of whether the 
cyber operation against SCADA systems at an Iranian nuclear fuel 
processing plant triggered an international armed conflict under 
IHL.119  The Stuxnet case is different from the previous situations of 
                                                             
(examining Russia’s desire to destabilize Ukraine through its power grid as a 
warning to the U.S.). 
 116 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for 
Cyberwar, WIRED (June 20, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-
attack-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/NV5N-9WWA] (addressing Russia’s use of 
Ukraine as a laboratory for perfecting new forms of global online combat). 
 117 See Shaun Walker, Group Allegedly Behind DNC Hack Targeted Ukraine, 
Report Finds, GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/22/dnc-hack-
crowdstrike-ukraine-malware-russia [https://perma.cc/HV45-J6NW] (describing 
the electronic attack on Estonia conducted by a pro-Kremlin youth group). 
 118 See Natalia Zinets, Ukraine Charges Russia with New Cyber Attacks on 
Infrastructure, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
ukraine-crisis-cyber/ukraine-charges-russia-with-new-cyber-attacks-on-
infrastructure-idUSKBN15U2CN [https://perma.cc/5AK8-99YF] (elaborating on 
the use of Telebots, a new mechanism to infect computers that control 
infrastructure, and Moscow’s continued insistence that it is not responsible for 
cyberattacks against Ukraine). 
 119 Beyond any jus in bello questions, the Stuxnet case also raises jus ad bellum 
issues.  More specifically, did the Stuxnet attack meet the threshold for an armed 
attack under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter?  Even if one disagrees that 
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violence involving Russia and Georgia/Ukraine in some important 
respects.  First, the cyber operation against Iran was not linked to a 
conventional operation, but was exclusively cyber.  To put a finer 
point on it, the Stuxnet virus was created and used to avoid a kinetic 
strike against the Iranian plant.120  However, Stuxnet was 
distinguishable from some other cyber operations in that it caused 
physical damage.  With respect to the specific question of whether 
the Stuxnet virus triggered an international armed conflict, there are 
queries about both the “international” and “armed” elements.  On 
the international element, no State, including Russia, has ever 
officially acknowledged that they were responsible for the attack.  
Much has been written and reported attributing Stuxnet to the 
United States and Israel.  As of this writing, neither State has 
publicly acknowledged a connection to Stuxnet.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to conclusively and officially state who is responsible for 
the virus.  That being said, given the sophistication and expense of 
the attack, it seems likely that a State was involved.  As to the 
“armed” element, the Experts contributing to Tallinn Manual 2.0 
were divided as to whether the damage to the centrifuges was 
sufficient to meet the armed requirement, and therefore could not 
make a ruling regarding whether the actor was “armed.”  
Consequently, it is very difficult to conclusively determine that 
Stuxnet amounted to an international armed conflict under IHL. 
The third case study that has a possible nexus to common Article 
2 and an international armed conflict is the 2007 Estonia DDoS 
incident.  The Estonians initially believed that the Russians launched 
the cyberattacks against them for several reasons.  First, the 
cyberattacks appeared to be linked to the relocation of a Soviet Red 
Army soldier memorial thereby pointing to a motive.121  Second, all 
                                                             
the Stuxnet virus amounted to an armed attack, it clearly met the threshold for 
prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 
 120 KAPLAN, supra note 49, at 204.  See also The Editors, Here’s How to End the 
Fog of Cyber War, SCI. AM. (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/here-s-how-to-end-the-fog-of-
cyber-war/ [https://perma.cc/7ACE-32AC] (describing the agendas international 
entities and countries are pushing to create a cybertruce and cooperate during 
cybercrime investigations). 
 121 See McGuinness, supra note 38 (identifying Russia as potentially 
responsible for the cyberattack while acknowledging that the identification is 
unproven and makes retaliation difficult). 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
672 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:3 
of the websites that were targeted by the DDoS attacks were in 
Estonia.  Third, Russian websites were used in planning, facilitating 
and coordinating the cyberattacks.  Fourth, those who planned and 
coordinated the attacks were fluent in Russian.  Fifth, Estonian 
authorities traced Internet addresses used in the attacks back to 
Russian government agencies.122  Finally, Estonian appeals to 
Moscow for assistance were ignored.123  The culprits of the attacks 
were ultimately believed to be a small group of Russian patriotic 
hacktivists associated with the pro-Kremlin youth group called 
Nashi (“Ours”), engaged in an online political protest.124  However, 
based off these facts, under IHL, the 2007 Estonian DDoS attack did 
not rise to the level of an international armed conflict for two 
reasons. 
First, there is insufficient evidence that Nashi or other hacktivists 
who perpetrated the attack were operating pursuant to instructions 
of the Russian government or under Russian direction or control.  As 
a practical matter, it is very difficult to prove that a State is 
controlling a non-State group with respect to the group’s actions in 
cyberspace.125  This is especially true when, like the present case, 
Russia never endorsed or adopted the conduct. 
Second, it would be difficult to say that a DDoS attack by itself 
meets the threshold of “armed” under common Article 2.  As noted 
by the Experts to the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the conduct of hostilities 
under IHL presupposes a collective application of means and 
methods of warfare.126  Of course, this begs the harder question -- 
                                                             
 122 SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS: THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE 
NATION STATE 85–86 (2009). 
 123 See McGuinness, supra note 38 (explaining how Estonia created the 
voluntary, “shadowy” Cyber Defence unit in response to Russia’s unwillingness to 
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 124 See Andrew Roche, Kremlin Loyalist Says Launched Estonia Cyber-Attack, 
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attack on Estonia that paralyzed the state’s Internet network). 
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supports the actions of a non-State group, that is insufficient to internationalize the 
situation.  Under IHL, the threshold for internationalizing a conflict remains a high 
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 126 Id. at 383. 
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does there have to be a threshold of requisite violence to meet the 
“armed” criteria to trigger IHL under common Article 2?  As 
mentioned previously, the commentary to the Third Geneva 
Convention makes clear there is no intensity requirement.  The 
drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions intended the threshold of 
international armed conflict to be low to ensure IHL applied when 
States were resorting to armed force against each other.127  By having 
a low threshold, the conflict would be subject to the international 
rule of law and the victims of the conflict would benefit from 
humanitarian protections.  Of course, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
were drafted and the 1960 commentary was written well before 
anyone could envision cyber operations and DDoS attacks.  Those 
who believe there should be an intensity requirement point to State 
practice.  This practice indicates there have been a number of 
incidents, such as sporadic border incidents or naval incidents that 
were not treated or characterized as international armed conflicts.128  
Professor Gary Solis characterizes such incidents as armed conflicts 
short of war and contends persuasively that such incidents do not 
trigger an international armed conflict.  Professor Solis also noted 
that a “key indicium [is] whether the incident is protracted.  The 
longer an incident continues, the more difficult it is to describe it as 
merely an incident.”129  By analogy, a single DDoS attack that causes 
only limited damage, destruction, injury, or death would not 
necessarily be considered a trigger for an international armed 
conflict. 
Candidly, there are some good arguments that the DDoS attacks 
in Estonia might have risen to the level of an “armed conflict.”  Chief 
among these arguments is the intensity of the attacks and their 
protracted nature.  The incident lasted weeks and targeted both 
public and private sectors.  For one of the most wired countries in 
the world like Estonia, a sustained, two-week DDoS incident is more 
than just an inconvenience.  Arguably, if Estonia had not been as 
sophisticated and adept at defending itself as it proved to be, the 
2007 DDoS attacks would have been far more devastating.130  
However, the greater weight of the available evidence militates 
                                                             
 127 Commentary, GC III, supra note 105, at 22–23. 
 128 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 383. 
 129 SOLIS, supra note 23, at 162. 
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against such a conclusion.  Ultimately, the hostilities that took place 
in Estonia did not constitute the “collective application of means and 
methods of warfare” sufficient to constitute an “armed conflict.”  
Thus, the Estonia incident cannot fairly be characterized as an 
international armed conflict and, therefore, IHL does not apply.131  
The primary reason for this conclusion is that the connection 
between Nashi and the Russian government was too nebulous and 
the purposefully high threshold for internationalizing an armed 
conflict was not met. 
In sum, whether a particular situation amounts to an 
international armed conflict under common Article 2 depends upon 
a totality of the circumstances.  Such determinations are often quite 
subjective and challenging, particularly when considering incidents 
involving new means, methods, and domains of warfare like cyber.  
The next step in the multi-tier analysis is to consider non-
international armed conflicts. 
5.  COMMON ARTICLE 3:  NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
Non-international or internal armed conflicts are armed conflicts 
that do not occur between States.  From a humanitarian perspective, 
the victims of international and non-international armed conflicts 
face similar problems and need similar protections.132  In some cases, 
the savageness and brutality of civil wars are even greater than those 
of international armed conflicts.133  For combatants or fighters 
conducting hostilities in the context of international or non-
international armed conflicts respectively, the distinction between 
the two types of conflicts may seem academic and quite divorced 
from reality.  States, on the other hand, have never agreed to treat 
international and non-international armed conflicts equally.134  
Generally speaking, since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, acts of 
sovereign leaders within their own territory have not been matters 
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for international concern or regulation.135  States have always 
considered non-international armed conflicts internal affairs 
regulated by domestic laws.136  As mentioned above, prior to the 
adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) was only intended to regulate wars 
between States with the limited exception of belligerency.  The 
initiation and waging of war was an exercise of sovereign power 
held by States.137  Treating an internal conflict as ‘war’ and subjecting 
it to international norms would have unduly elevated the status of 
those perpetrating violence as non-state actors. 
The sea change occurred with the addition of common Article 3 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Common Article 3, sometimes 
referred to as the “convention in miniature,” may be the most 
significant innovation to the 1949 Geneva Conventions because it 
established baseline humanitarian protections for the victims of 
non-international armed conflicts.138  Prior to 1949, there were no 
codified provisions of IHL that specifically addressed non-
international armed conflicts.139  Common Article 3 was the first of 
its kind.  Specifically, it provides as follows: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as 
a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms 
and those placed ‘ hors de combat ‘ by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded 
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. 
                                                             
 135 SOLIS, supra note 23, at 104. 
 136 SASSÒLI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 324. 
 137 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I art. 3, supra note 74. 
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To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the 
Parties to the conflict.  The Parties to the conflict should 
further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect 
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.140 
The protections of common Article 3 were supplemented in 1977 
with Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.141  
Classifying non-international armed conflicts is more difficult than 
international ones.  There are several reasons for this conclusion. 
                                                             
 140 Geneva I, supra note 79, art. 3. 
 141 International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/3
2019] Conflict Classification and Cyber Operations 677 
First, States are generally reluctant to classify situations of 
violence in their territory as non-international armed conflicts for 
fear that doing so would not only legitimize a group or groups 
fighting against the government, but also because it would trigger 
international regulation under IHL.  The second reason why it is 
more difficult to classify non-international armed conflicts stems 
from the definition of the term itself.  Common Article 3 defines a 
non-international armed conflict in the negative.  A non-
international armed conflict is defined as a conflict that is “not of an 
international character”.  It is defined in contradistinction to an 
international one, as opposed to being a conflict in its own right.  A 
third point is that there are situations of violence that occur within a 
State that fall below the threshold of an armed conflict.  These 
include: riots, criminality, and sporadic acts of violence that do not 
trigger a non-international armed conflict.  Again, because “armed 
conflict” was never defined in the corpus of IHL, the threshold for a 
non-international armed conflict developed through international 
case law.  Not surprisingly, in its landmark Tadić case, ICTY set forth 
two criteria for a non-international armed conflict.  These criteria 
reflect customary international law: intensity of the hostilities and 
organization of the armed group.142  The ICTY stated, in the 
pertinent part, as follows: 
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of 
an armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in 
Common Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the 
intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to 
the conflict.  In an armed conflict of an internal . . . character, 
these closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose, 
as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from 
banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or 
terrorist activities, which are not subject to international 
humanitarian law.143 
Similar to international armed conflicts, there are a number of 
issues raised when looking at non-international armed conflicts 
                                                             
 142 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 387 (explaining that the holding 
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through the lens of cyber operations.  The starting point for such an 
analysis is Rule 83 of Tallinn Manual 2.0, which acknowledges that 
non-international armed conflicts may include or be limited to cyber 
operations between governmental armed forces and organized 
groups or between one or more organized groups (without the 
involvement of governmental armed forces).144  Rule 83, which is 
also a reflection of customary international law, reiterates that the 
protracted armed violence must meet the Tadić criteria.145  As a 
threshold matter, the Experts in Tallinn Manual 2.0 recognized that, 
in theory, cyber operations alone, without kinetic actions, could 
trigger a non-international armed conflict because the application of 
IHL does not depend upon a specific type of military operation, or 
a particular means or method of warfare. 
They did note, however, that this would be an “exceptional” case 
because of the threshold of violence required and the level of 
organization of the group resorting to such violence.146  In terms of 
the organization requirement, which is a factual, context specific 
determination, the ICTY commented that the non-State armed 
group does not have to have the organizational structure of a State 
party’s conventional military unit.  Some degree of organization by 
the non-State armed group will be sufficient to meet the standard.147  
There are a number of factors that may be helpful in making such a 
determination: the organization and structure of the armed group, 
the use of internal regulations; the capacity to engage in coordinated 
military operations; the ability to provide military training, and the 
ability to enforce discipline and ensure compliance with IHL.148  The 
significance of these criterion is that it would preclude lone hackers, 
                                                             
 144 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 385 (setting forth Rule 83: “A 
non-international armed conflict exists whenever there is protracted armed 
violence, which may include or be limited to cyber operations, occurring between 
governmental armed forces and organized armed groups, or between such 
groups”). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 385–86. 
 147 NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & RUSSELL BUCHAN, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 337 (2015) (arguing that the transcendental 
nature of cyber warfare reignites the disagreement as to whether common article 3 
places a spatial element on non-international armed conflict, therefore limiting its’ 
the geographical scope). 
 148 Id. at 338. 
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or even individuals ideologically sympathetic to a particular cause 
acting collectively but not as a coordinated entity, from meeting the 
organizational requirement.149 
The larger question is whether “virtual groups” that organize 
exclusively online could meet the organization criteria.  Even 
though such groups are able to carry out cyber operations in a 
coordinated matter, most commentators believe that such groups 
are not sufficiently organized to meet the Tadić organization 
requirement.  The reason is simple -- virtual groups lack the ability 
to enforce discipline and ensure compliance with IHL.150  They have 
no physical control over their members.  The classic example of such 
a group is the collective “Anonymous.”  This decentralized group of 
international hacktivists has been linked to a number of high-profile 
incidents, including internet attacks on governments, major 
corporations, financial institutions and religious groups.151  
Notwithstanding their effectiveness and high profile, Anonymous 
would arguably not meet the criteria for a non-State armed group 
under IHL because it does not possess the ability to enforce 
discipline within its membership, nor to ensure that its members 
comply with IHL.  Of course, virtual groups raise thought-
provoking questions like the extent to which the capacity to enforce 
rules and discipline is a critical component of an organization for 
classification purposes.  Another good question is whether physical 
control is a necessary precondition for the purpose of organization. 
The second requirement for determining whether an episode of 
violence constitutes the initiation of a non-international armed 
conflict is the intensity of the violence.  As previously mentioned, 
for the purpose of triggering a non-international armed conflict, the 
hostilities between the parties must reach a certain level of 
intensity.152  Criteria indicating a sufficient intensity level would 
include, but are not limited to: the gravity and frequency of attacks, 
                                                             
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Geneva Sands, What to Know About the Worldwide Hacker Group 
‘Anonymous,’ ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/worldwide-
hacker-group-anonymous/story?id=37761302 [https://perma.cc/D3M7-PY5T] 
(detailing the identity and principles of the hacker group “anonymous”, specifically 
focusing on the manner in which broad membership runs the gamut of the 
organization). 
 152 TSAGOURIAS & BUCHAN, supra note 147, at 340. 
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the temporal and territorial expansion of the violence; the collective 
nature and scope of the hostilities; the control of the territory by the 
non-State armed group, the number and type of governmental 
forces responding to the violence; the type and distribution of 
weapons used by the armed group; the extent to which the 
population has been effected or displaced by the hostilities; and 
whether the situation of violence has come to the attention of the 
United Nations Security Council.153  In the Commentary to Rule 83, 
the Experts provided a non-exhaustive list of activities that would 
not meet the intensity requirement, including but not limited to: 
network intrusion, the deletion or destruction of data, computer 
network exploitation, defacing websites, data theft, as well as the 
blocking of certain Internet functions or services.154 
With respect to intensity, one of the issues the Experts struggled 
with was whether a non-destructive, but severe, cyber operation 
could cause a violent situation to transform into a non-international 
armed conflict.155  Necessarily intertwined with this is the question 
of whether this same situation would trigger the application of 
common Article 3.156  Such a cyber operation coupled with other 
actions could cumulatively surpass the intensity threshold for a non-
international armed conflict.  For example, suppose a non-State 
armed group conducts a cyber-attack against a State’s armed forces 
and exploits and destroys data vital to the defense of the State.  That 
cyber operation, coupled with certain physical acts of violence, 
could certainly tip the balance and transform a situation of violence 
into a non-international armed conflict.157 
                                                             
 153 Id. at 340–1. 
 154 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 388. 
 155 Id. at 389.  Depending on the specific factual circumstances, it may also 
trigger Additional Protocol II. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Conversation with Tomas Minarik, Senior Research at the NATO CCD 
COE (October 15, 2017).  Left unanswered, however, is whether a cyberattack that 
is not coupled with certain physical acts of violence could transform a situation of 
violence into a non-international armed conflict.  For example, if a non-State entity 
used cyber means to map out the strength, capabilities, and disposition of its 
adversary’s armed force for potential use in a future attack, would the 
extensiveness of the intrusion and the sensitivity of the information collected suffice 
to meet the intensity threshold?  Or would it depend upon the occurrence of a 
subsequent attack? 
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The last case study involving ISIS illustrates a non-international 
armed conflict which involved the use of cyber operations.  To 
provide greater context, the armed conflict involving ISIS in Syria, 
Iraq, and elsewhere in the world is complex and difficult to classify, 
in part, because of all of the contending parties involved, State and 
non-State.  Although sorting out the nuances of all of the conflict 
classification issues with ISIS is well beyond the scope of this article, 
it is fair to say that most of the hostilities involving ISIS are non-
international armed conflicts because ISIS is a non-State armed 
group.158  With ISIS, there is no doubt that they meet the Tadić 
intensity and organizational criteria.159  To the degree that there is 
an issue, it relates to the geographical scope of the non-international 
armed conflict.  In 2016, the United States National 
Counterterrorism Center reported that the Islamic State was 
operational in 18 different countries around the world.  It also found 
indications of what it characterized as “aspiring branches” in Mali, 
Egypt, Somalia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines.160  As 
will be discussed below in more detail, the geographical dimensions 
of non-international armed conflicts are difficult to conceptualize in 
the context of cyber operations.161  Beyond the specific issues 
associated with cyber operations in common Articles 2 and 3, there 
are also gaps, ambiguities, and fault lines inherent in conflict 
classification under IHL, writ large. 
                                                             
 158 See David Wallace, Amy McCarthy, & Shane Reeves, Trying to Make Sense 
of the Senseless: Classifying the Syrian War under the Law of Armed Conflict, 25 MICH. 
ST. INT’L. L. REV. (Aug. 21, 2017) (detailing the actors involved in the Syrian Civil 
War and classifying them under international law, including ISIS). 
 159 See Christopher Woody, US Special Operations Command Chief Claims ‘60,000 
to 70,000’ ISIS Fighters Have Been Killed, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jul. 24, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/gen-raymond-thomas-socom-60000-to-70000-
isis-fighters-killed-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/35QA-FBUV] (detailing that at any 
given time, it is difficult to determine how many fighters belong to ISIS.  “In 2014, 
an observer group estimated the terror group had 100,000 fighters.  The Pentagon 
said in summer 2016 that it had just 15,000 to 20,000 fighters left in Iraq and Syria.”)  
Id. 
 160 See ISLAMIC STATE AND THE CRISIS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA IN MAPS, BBC NEWS, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 
[https://perma.cc/PX6D-5HYY] (last visited Oct 8, 2017) (explaining the results of 
recapturing Iraq and Syria territory which were previously claimed by jihadist 
groups). 
 161 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20 at 378 (describing geographical 
limitations on the law of armed conflict). 
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6.  CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION AND CYBER: GAPS, AMBIGUITIES, AND 
FAULT LINES 
The binary classification paradigm established by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions goes to the very heart of the regulation of 
armed conflicts.  As presented above, cyber operations pose several 
challenging issues with respect to the application and interpretation 
of common Articles 2 and 3.  Beyond those specific issues, there are 
a number of overarching complexities that create gaps, ambiguities, 
and fault lines with respect to applying IHL to cyber operations 
generally and to issues related to conflict classification specifically.  
The first involves the problem of attribution. 
Attribution is considered an intractable theoretical and practical 
problem permeating every aspect of cyber operations.  Commenting 
on attribution, author Joel Brenner wistfully observed that, “the 
internet is one big masquerade ball.  You can hide behind aliases, 
you can hide behind proxy servers, and you can surreptitiously 
enslave other computers to do your dirty work.”162  Hence, 
attribution creates technical, policy and legal issues.  From a 
technical perspective, attribution can be utterly perplexing because 
hackers have tools, tactics, and techniques that effectively and 
efficiently cover their tracks.  One method a cyber intruder can use 
is a so-called botnet.  Botnets are a network comprised of computers 
remotely controlled by an intruder to conduct coordinated cyber 
operations.  With no practical limit to the number of bots that can be 
assimilated into a botnet, it could become extremely difficult to 
know the origin of any given cyber operation.163 
From a policy perspective, some influential thought leaders have 
argued that there is a misplaced “attribution fixation” for many who 
believe that attribution must start at the lowest, most technical 
levels.  They argue persuasively that it is necessary to take one step 
back and think more broadly about attribution.  Under this 
argument, the focus should be placed on those things that decision-
                                                             
 162 See Marco Roscini, Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State 
Responsibility for Cyber Operations in CYBER WAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL 
CONFLICTS 215 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015) (explaining that evidentiary 
problems in inter-state litigation are not peculiar to cyber operations). 
 163 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20 at 563 (describing neutrality and 
Security Council actions). 
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makers actually need to know about a cyber-attack.  What they 
really need to know is who is ultimately responsible for the attack.  
Knowing who actually pressed the keys is not necessarily 
dispositive or particularly helpful unless it leads to insights into who 
is ultimately culpable for the attack.164  Finally, with respect to 
attribution and the law, there are many challenging issues.  The 
Experts who worked on Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed, as a general 
matter, regarding the ex ante uncertainty as to the attribution of 
cyber operations, noting: 
States must act as reasonable States would in the same or 
similar circumstances when considering responses to them 
[cyber attacks].  Reasonableness is always context 
dependent.  It depends on such factors as reliability, 
quantum, directness, nature (e.g., technical data, human 
intelligence), and specificity of the relevant available 
information when considered in light of the attendant 
circumstance and the importance of the right involved.  
These factors must be considered together.  Importantly in 
the cyber context, deficiencies in technical intelligence may 
be compensated by, for example, the existence of highly 
reliable human intelligence.165 
In terms of the classification of international and non-
international armed conflicts, the problem is somewhat obvious.  
Under IHL, conflict classification is premised on the assumption that 
the identity of one’s adversary is known.166  To the degree, conflict 
classification issues arose regarding attribution, it typically involved 
the question of whether the conduct of a non-State armed group was 
legally attributable to a State.  As discussed above, that is an 
important issue because it could have the effect of internationalizing 
the armed conflict thereby placing it under common Article 2 
instead of common Article 3.  The outcome of this analysis could also 
                                                             
 164 See Jason Healy, The Spectrum of National Responsibility for Cyberattacks, 18 
BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 43–56, 43 (2011) (explaining that the cyberdefense 
community must accept the idea that national policy makers need to know the 
responsibility for an attack). 
 165 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 82 (describing the law of 
international responsibility for wrongful acts by a State). 
 166 See TSAGOURIAS & BUCHAN, supra note 147, at 332 (explaining how to classify 
cyber warfare). 
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mean the conduct at issue is not covered by IHL at all.  Of course, 
the attribution issue goes beyond the non-State actors being de facto 
agents for States.  The ability of State and non-State armed groups 
to be virtually anonymous in carrying out cyber operations is a 
reality; put more prosaically --”electrons don’t wear uniforms.”167  
States targeted with cyber operations often find their response 
options severely limited in the absence of an identifiable perpetrator 
of the operations.168  Logically, absent the ability to attribute the 
cyber operation to a State party or non-State armed group, conflict 
classification is impossible.169  Future advancements in technology 
may make attribution easier.  But, as it stands now, attribution 
efforts are often enormously time-consuming and require extensive 
technical and non-technical investigative means and analytical 
techniques to gather, preserve, and analyze the evidence.170 
The second issue concerns the current status of the binary 
classification paradigm and how that relates to cyber operations.  In 
many ways, the binary conflict classification paradigm and the 
consequences that flow from it has evolved both substantively and 
procedurally over the last seven decades.  First, in terms of 
substance, there has been a general tendency to reduce the 
differences between the rules that are applicable to international and 
non-international armed conflicts.171  This trend toward 
convergence to more of a unitary legal standard under IHL can be 
seen in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, the 
influence of human rights laws and even some international 
agreements that specify the application in international and non-
                                                             
 167 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 19, at 139 
(describing how to characterize an incoming cyberattack and its attribution). 
 168 See Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Proxy Wars in Cyber Space: The Evolving 
International Law of Attribution, FLETCHER SECURITY REVIEW 55 (2014) (describing that 
a multilevel legal analysis is required in order to attribute cyber activities of a non-
state group or individual, or even in some cases another state to a state as a matter 
of international law). 
 169 This assumes, of course, there is no conventional or kinetic “resort to 
armed force” that could be used as the basis to classify a conflict. 
 170 See TSAGOURIAS & BUCHAN, supra note 147, at 332 (explaining how to classify 
cyber warfare). 
 171 See SASSO ̀LI, BOUVIER & QUINTIN, supra note 27, at 124 (describing general 
protection of populations against certain consequences of war). 
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international armed conflicts.172  Commenting on this movement 
toward convergence, an ICRC publication stated, in part, as follows: 
[I]t has even been suggested in some quarters that the 
differences be eliminated altogether.  In the many fields 
where the treaty rules still differ, this convergence has been 
rationalized by claiming that under customary international 
law the difference between the two categories of conflict has 
gradually disappeared.  The ICRC study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law comes, after ten years of 
research, to the conclusion that 136 (and arguably even 141) 
out of 161 rules of customary international humanitarian 
law, many of which are based on rules of Protocol I 
applicable as a treaty to international armed conflicts, apply 
equally to non-international armed conflicts.173 
Although far from settled or agreed upon, there is certainly some 
logical appeal to the notion that there is a substantive body of 
customary IHL that applies to both international and non-
international armed conflicts.174  Encapsulating this notion, in Tadić, 
ICTY noted that, “what is inhumane and consequently proscribed, 
in international wars, cannot but be inhumane in civil strife.”175  
However, it is highly unlikely there will ever be a complete 
convergence of the IHL governing international and non-
international armed conflicts.  The reason is simply that States will 
never agree to combatant status for members of non-State armed 
groups fighting against governments in non-international armed 
conflicts.  To provide such a status would mean that such fighters 
would have combatant immunity and be entitled to prisoner of war 
status upon capture.  It is simply unfathomable States would go that 
far even if driven by altruistic humanitarian impulses or more 
pragmatic concerns like encouraging reciprocity by the insurgents.  
From a conflict classification perspective, the significance of 
convergence is that it leaves an erroneous impression that the 
                                                             
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
71 (2015) (explaining that conditions set out in Article 1 mean that the Protocol’s 
scope of application is narrower than that of Common Article 3). 
 175 Id. citing Tadić Jurisdiction, paras. 117–26. 
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distinction between international and non-international armed 
conflicts is not vitally important.  This false impression may be 
exacerbated when the conflict at issue is limited to or primarily 
conducted by cyber operations, which already lack the traditional 
feel of a conventional armed conflict. 
Notwithstanding the concerns mentioned above, the most 
significant issues are procedural176 in nature.  That is, hostilities over 
the past two decades are not always easily or neatly classified as 
either an international or non-international armed conflict as was 
envisioned and proscribed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  For 
example, some scholars have progressively theorized that, in 
addition to international and non-international armed conflicts, 
there are now “transnational armed conflicts” which have been born 
out of State practice.  This type of conflict arguably emerged from 
counter-terror military operations between States and non-State 
groups outside the territory of the State.177  There are also mixed 
conflicts that have both internal and international characteristics.  
Such conflicts may require a legal determination as to conflict 
classification at each particular phase of the operation to ensure the 
correct portion of IHL is being applied.178  Additionally, there are 
some situations that have been characterized as “armed conflicts 
short of war.”179  This category might encompass a border or coastal 
incident between States involving limited, short-lived violence.  
There are also situations of violence in an ungoverned territory in 
failed States that may create conflict classification challenges.  And, 
                                                             
 176 In this context, the term “procedural” is intended to frame how and when 
the substantive rules apply.  For example, procedurally, common Article 2 and 
common Article 3 delineate which rules apply under given circumstances.  
Substantively, this means that individuals taking part in a conflict deemed to be an 
international armed conflict (and, therefore, governed by common Article 2) would 
be accorded the status of “combatant.” 
 177 See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A 
‘Principled’ Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL 
L. REV. 46 (2009) (explaining that LOAC principles must be identified and must be 
broad enough to provide the authority necessary to bring the transnational enemy 
to submission). 
 178 See Akande, supra note 62, at 63 (providing the example of intervention by 
multinational forces under UN command or authorized by the UN). 
 179 See SOLIS, supra note 23, at 161 (including cross-border terrorist attacks by 
non-state Actors). 
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of course, there is cyber warfare.  Commenting on the procedural 
challenges associated with cyber operations, Professor Schmitt 
observed: 
In the future, cyber warfare will further complicate 
classification.  Cyber operations have the potential for 
producing vast societal and economic disruption without 
causing physical damage typically associated with armed 
conflict.  They are also inherently transborder, thereby 
frustrating any approach to classification based on 
geographical factors.  Moreover, massive attacks can be 
launched by a single individual or by a group that is 
organized entirely online.  This is in sharp contrast to 
traditional warfare, which depends on either the 
involvement of a State’s armed forces or that of a group 
capable of mounting typical military operations.180 
Given the above, it is clear that the traditional binary 
classification paradigm is being stressed both substantively and 
procedurally.  The emergence of cyber operations will only 
exacerbate these stresses. 
A third issue relates to how traditionally-understood 
geographical limitations, which are part of the fabric of IHL, are to 
be conceptualized and considered in cyber operations.  These limits 
are particularly germane in non-international armed conflicts.  That 
is, the geographical scope of non-international armed conflicts 
under common Article 3 has been a matter of intense debate for 
some time.  One view is that the plain language of common Article 
3 signifies that non-international armed conflicts are limited to the 
territory of a single State.  This is the most restrictive approach.181  It 
traces its origin to the first sentence of common Article 3 which 
seems to limit the application of the rule to armed conflicts “not of 
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the 
                                                             
 180 See Schmitt, supra note 28, at 246 (explaining that cyber operations have the 
potential for producing vast societal and economic disruption without causing the 
physical damage). 
 181 See Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International 
Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUDIES 1, 9 (2014) (explaining that according to the most 
restrictive approach to the geographical scope of non-international armed conflict 
based on Common Article 3, conflicts take place within a State’s geopolitical 
borders). 
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High Contracting Parties.”182  Going beyond the specific language of 
common Article 3, non-international armed conflicts have 
traditionally been understood to be conflicts occurring within the 
confines of a particular State.  Such conflicts are also referred to as 
“internal” armed conflicts.183  A logical inference under this 
interpretation is that an armed conflict that crosses State borders 
becomes an international armed conflict.184 
A second, more palatable position is that the word “one” in the 
first sentence of common Article 3 refers to any of the State parties 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.185  Given that the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions are the most ratified treaty in the history of the world 
(with every recognized State in the world having ratified all four 
conventions),186 the phrase would impose no territorial limitation.187  
Additionally, as noted in the 2016 Commentary to common Article 
3, the object and purpose of the article supports its application 
beyond the territory of one State.  That is, the aim of common Article 
3 is to provide persons not participating or no longer actively 
participating in hostilities with baseline humanitarian protections 
during non-international armed conflicts.  Therefore, it is logical that 
those same protections would apply when such situations of 
violence span the territory of more than one State.188  As such, it is 
possible to have a non-international armed conflict against ISIS that 
spans many countries.  Of course, when one considers the above 
debate in light of cyber operations, the fault lines are somewhat 
obvious.  More specifically, cyber operations in furtherance of and 
closely related to non-international armed conflicts can be launched 
                                                             
 182 Geneva I, supra note 79, art. 3. 
 183 See Commentary, GC III, supra note 105, at 455 (commenting that non-
international armed conflicts have been understood as conflicts occurring within 
the limits of a single states, which are described as “internal” armed conflicts). 
 184 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386.  This presumes that both parties 
are States, or a State and a proxy of another State. 
 185 Id. 
 186 SOLIS, supra note 23 at 88. 
 187 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386 (explaining that the phrase 
imposes no territorial limitations so long as the relevant States are Parties to the 
Conventions). 
 188 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at 467 (discussing the purpose 
of common Article 3 which leads to providing persons with protections when 
violence spans beyond the territory of one State). 
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remotely, far removed from the territory in which the conventional 
hostilities are happening.189  The Tallinn Manual 2.0 Experts 
“acknowledged the existence of a narrower approach that accepts 
the possibility of a non-international armed conflict that crosses 
borders, but which imposes a requirement of geographical 
proximity to the State involved in the conflict.”190 
Additionally, in interpreting common Article 3, questions have 
been raised as to whether IHL applies to the entire territory of a State 
in which a non-international armed conflict is occurring or whether 
the application of the law is limited to only that portion of the State 
where hostilities are occurring.  Put in a slightly different manner, 
in the regions of a State that are peaceful, do the State’s criminal laws 
and procedures provide a sufficient legal framework?191  The Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 Experts opined that in a non-international armed conflict, 
the application of IHL is not limited only to areas of active hostilities.  
Rather, IHL would apply to the entirety of the State.192  There is, 
                                                             
 189 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386–7.  As noted by the Experts, 
some States have weak or ineffective regulatory mechanisms to prevent or stop 
cyber activity from occurring on their territories.  Such States could be an appealing 
base of cyber operations for non-State actors to attack governments in other States 
where non-international armed conflicts are occurring. 
 190 Id. at 382.  This attempt at creating a geographical limitation does not 
appear workable in the cyber realm given the difficulty of attribution. 
 191 See 2016 COMMENTARY, CG I, supra note 74, at 456–64 (discussing whether 
the application of humanitarian law concerns the whole of the State or is limited to 
areas where hostilities are occurring). 
 192 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 386.  There is ample support 
for the position of the Experts.  First, the language of common Article 3 itself 
supports their position.  It provides that “[t]o this end, the following acts are and 
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever.”  Second, in Tadić, 
the ICTY stated, in part, as follows: 
67.  . . .  the temporal and geographical scope of both internal and 
international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of 
hostilities.  . . . 
69.  . . .  beneficiaries of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are 
those taking no active part (or no longer taking active part) in the 
hostilities. This indicates that the rules contained in Article 3 also apply 
outside the narrow geographical context of the actual theatre of combat 
operations.  . . . 
70.  . . .  international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole 
territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
690 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:3 
however, a practical limitation on the application of IHL anywhere 
in the State.  That limitation is rooted in the foundational 
requirement that for IHL to apply there must be a nexus between 
the conduct in question and the armed conflict.193 
A fourth, and final, reason for the gaps, ambiguities, and fault 
lines with respect to applying IHL to cyber operations concerns the 
“militarization” of cyberspace.  There has been a great deal of 
discussion and debate about this issue.194  That concern is reflected 
in a number of ways.  For one, States are establishing military 
organizations that are developing cyber offensive and defensive 
capabilities.  Cyberspace has been designated as an operational 
domain for warfighting purposes.195  Important thought leaders, like 
Brad Smith, the President of Microsoft, called for a digital Geneva 
Convention in 2017.  In his speech entitled, “Protecting and 
Defending against Cyberthreats in Uncertain Times,” Smith 
highlighted the troubling fact that recent years have seen an 
expansion in the number of incidents whereby States have engaged 
in cyber operations against other States.196  He forcefully argued that 
                                                             
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes 
place there. 
See also 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at 457–68 citing ICTY, Tadić Decision 
on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995, at 67–70 
(emphasizing that once a non-international armed conflict occurs, Article 3 applies 
in the territory of the concerned State in its entirety). 
 193 See 2016 COMMENTARY, GC I, supra note 74, at 460 (noting that the 
applicability of humanitarian law in the whole territory of a State party to the 
conflict is subject to the condition that a particular act must be related to the non-
intentional armed conflict). 
 194 See Sean Lawson, Is the United States Militarizing Cyberspace?, FORBES (Nov. 
2, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2012/11/02/is-the-united-
states-militarizing-cyberspace/#1d260267798d [https://perma.cc/QLX3-6F7R] 
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the 2014 Sony attack by North Korea was a turning point.197  In that 
highly publicized cyber incident, North Korean hackers stole 
confidential documents and data from a Hollywood studio and 
posted them online.  U.S. government officials believe that North 
Korea targeted Sony because it backed the film, “The Interview,” 
which depicts an assassination plot against the North Korean leader, 
Kim Jong-Un.198  Using militaristic language and imagery, Smith 
described cyberspace as a new battlefield, albeit different than the 
other war fighting domains of land, sea, air, and space.  In doing so, 
Smith eloquently and thoughtfully laid out arguments for a new 
international treaty.199  He specifically noted: 
We need a convention that will call on the world’s 
governments to pledge that they will not engage in 
cyberattacks on the private sector.  That they will not target 
civilian infrastructure, whether it’s of the electrical or the 
economic or the political variety.  We need governments to 
pledge that instead they will work with the private sector to 
respond to vulnerabilities.  That they will not stockpile 
vulnerabilities and they will take additional measures.200 
The problem, of course, is that the Sony incident neither 
triggered the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
specifically, nor IHL, generally.  Such violations of sovereignty fall 
under a peacetime international law regime.  This example is 
illustrative of a much larger trend.  That is, the vast majority of 
incidents that occur in cyber space between States or States and non-
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State armed groups are below the threshold for an armed conflict 
and, therefore, do not trigger IHL.  Therefore, to protect and 
preserve IHL for its intended purposes, cyber activities must be 
carefully and appropriately analysed and categorized under the IHL 
binary classification system.  Otherwise, IHL runs the risk of being 
watered down and marginalized in the long run. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The issue of conflict classification is arguably the single most 
important inquiry when applying IHL.  It is always the first step in 
establishing a framework to analyse any IHL issues.  Even though 
the binary classification paradigm established by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions is already stressed by contemporary conventional 
conflicts, and will be stressed even further by the emergence of 
cyberspace operations, the binary classification system remains the 
best way for the international community to conceptualize, classify, 
and (in some fashion, at least) control this new domain of warfare.  
Given the continuously-evolving nature of cyber operations, it 
remains all the more important to maintain a body of law that has 
withstood the test of time while achieving near-universal 
acceptance.  The binary classification system within IHL remains 
viable.  Accordingly, it should be preserved and reinforced. 
There are three reasons for this conclusion.  First, going back to 
first principles, IHL applies to cyber operations in the context of an 
armed conflict.  With very few treaties that deal directly with cyber 
operations and with State practice often being highly classified,201 it 
is critically important to interpret and analyze the established lex lata 
of IHL in the context of cyber operations.  When it comes to IHL, 
there is nothing that is more foundational than common Articles 2 
and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  To deviate from or 
marginalize the IHL conflict classification paradigm because of the 
novelty and nuances of cyberspace operations would be unwise.  In 
other words, the development of IHL should be evolutionary, not 
revolutionary.  This important work should be viewed as an effort 
to bring cyberspace under the mantle of existing law, not to create 
an entirely new framework. 
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A second, and related, point is that there is very little incentive 
for States to agree to anything that legitimizes non-State armed 
groups fighting against governmental forces.  Therefore, there will 
always be at least two categories of armed conflict.  Moreover, even 
though there are some unique characteristics to modern day 
conflicts, such as fighting against non-State groups in the territory 
of another State, the paradigm still procedurally works.  Stressed 
does not mean broken.  To the extent that ambiguities and gaps in 
the law remain, States can and should do more to clarify and 
facilitate the orderly and thoughtful development of IHL. 
The third reason relates to the militarization of cyberspace.  
International humanitarian law reflects a delicate balance between 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations.  It is a check 
and balance system intended to minimize human suffering without 
undermining military operations.202  In some respects, the purpose 
of IHL – to introduce moderation and restraint in warfare – is 
extraordinarily difficult to achieve.  Its very application is 
predicated upon the existence of an armed conflict.  If that 
circumstance does not exist, it is important to recognize that other 
principles of international law apply to the conflict – but not IHL.  
This enables IHL to continue to do what it does best – regulating 
armed conflict – without being diluted through its application to 
situations that do not rise to the level of either international or non-
international armed conflict. 
 
                                                             
 202 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2004) (examining the law of international 
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